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FOREWORD 
T h e  International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is preparing a 
Handbook of Spsrems Analysis, which will appear in three volumes: 
V d u m e  I :  Overvieu is aimed at a widely varied audience of producers and 
users of systems analysis 
V d u m e  2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; the volume contains introductory over- 
views of such methods 
V d u m e  3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems analyses that illustrate 
the methods and diversity of systems analysis 
Volume 1 will have ten chapters: 
1. T h e  context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2 Applied syskn-IS a~alysis: a ge~ietic approach 
9. Examples of systems analysis 
4. T h e  method of applied systems analysis: finding a solution 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
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6. Generating alternatives for systems analysis 
7. Estimating and predicting consequences 
8 Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. Principles of good practice 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis terms and a bibliogra- 
phy of basic books in the fleld. 
Drafts of this material are being widely circulated for comments and sugges- 
tions for improvement. In addition to responding to such interventions, the task of de- 
tailed cwrdination of the chapters-prepared separately by several authors-has yet tir be 
carried out. Correspondence about this material should be addressed to the undersigned. 
This working Paper is the current draft of Chapter 9. It was prepared by 
E.S. Quade using material developed by Rolfe Tornlinsan as a point of departure. 
A word about the format of this Working P v r .  In order to make thp text 
of each chapter easily amended. it has been entered into the IIASA computer, from 
which the current version can be reproduced in a few minute's time whenever needed. 
This Worlung Paper was produced from the version current on the date shown on each 
Page- 
Hugh J. Miser 
Survey Pr~ject  
April SO, 1980 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
Edward S. Quade 
If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been 
churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces 
W. Shakespeare 
Although Shakespeare may have taken sane poetic license, to do what has 
been decided were best to do is a problem in many decisionmaking contexts, particularly 
those involving public policy. Systems analysis is not simply an academic exercise; its 
goal is to help bring about change for the better, to see what is done is what was decided. 
Change requires more than the words expressing a decision or policy mandate; it requires 
the expenditure of energy, time, and resources. This change is implementation: the pro- 
cess of rearranging patterns of conduct so as to honor the prescriptions set forth in a de- 
cision. 
When a systems analysis is commissioned, the sponsor usually has a goal in 
mind. He would like to discover a course of action that will accomplish something he 
wants at an acceptable cost, a course of action that he can adopt and can convince others 
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with whom he shares authority to adopt. Moreover, he hopes the action, tf chosen, can 
be s u c c ~ l l y  implemented, namely, that it not be so modified by the organization that 
carries it out, or by rival agencies, or constrained by the courts, or repudiated by the 
public, or resisted by those who must change their patterns of behavior, or otherwise 
frustrated, that it does not accomplish what was intended. 
For certain kinds of problems and contexts full implementation is a dream. 
The aim of this chapter is to suggest ways for the analyst to help make it less so. Unfor- 
tunately, beside pointing out some of the many reasons why implementation can go wrong 
and suggesting a number of rather obvious general guidelines, we have little practical 
advice to offer. Implementation is currently an active topic for research by systems 
analysts; there are numerous papers pointing out where implementation has failed, but 
many fewer that tell what to do during the study before the decision is taken to make 
failure less likely. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The term implementation can have several meanings. Bardach (1980) iden- 
tifies four: 
(a) Adoption of a policy recommendation by an authoritative individual or 
institution. as in T h e  client has endorxd our analysis of airport landing fees and will 
soon promulgate regulations to implement it." This is typically an operations researcher's 
or planner's usage (Huysmans, 1970). 
(b) The cmpiriial details that reflect, or represent, the application of a policy 
principle, as in 'EMuent taxes are fine in prinrlple, but when it comes to implementing 
them we see that they are often set too low.' (It should be noted that 'implementation" in 
this sense is bwnd to be somewhat imperfect, for the same log~cal reason that there is al- 
ways a slippage between a theoretical construct and the operations that are used to meas- 
ure it empirically.) 
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(c) The  operating routines of an organization, or a network of organizations, 
that have been brought into being or have been modifled by some pdlcy mandate, as in 
'Over the yews we have found it necessary to shift our implementation methods away 
from a reliance on regular audits to voluntary compliance and elf-reporting.' 
(d) The  process of rearranging patterns of social conduct so as to honor the 
prescriptions set forth in some policy mandate, as in "We are implementing the new 
workmen's compensation law just as fast as we can.' 
For this Handbook, implementation is the process suggested by statement (d). 
I t  garts  after the decision to adopt a particular course of actim is made. Implementation 
ends successfully provided the goals defined by the decision are achieved and the finan- 
cial cogs and the delay in reaching these goals are held to a reasonable level. 
Lack of success, however, should not necessarily be charged as a failure 
against the implementing organization . T h e  circumstances under which the policy was 
designed to operate may have changed following the decision, the costs in time and mo- 
ney may have been deliberately biased downward by the sponsor in order to secure the 
approval of other decisionmakers, or the policy design itself may have been defective 
and ill-conceived. 
The  importance of giving thought to implementation has long been recognized 
but not the analyst's responsibility to do so. Witness Aesop's Fable T h e  Mice in Coun- 
cil-: 
A certain Cat that lived in a large countryhouse was so vigilant and active, 
that the Mice, finding their numbers grievously thinned, held a council, with 
closed doors, to consider what they had best do. Many plans had been start- 
ed and dismissed, when a young Mouse, rising and catchlng the eye of the 
president, said that he had a proposal to make, that he was sure must meet 
with the approval of alL If,' said he, 'the Cat  wore around her neck a bell, 
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every step she took would make it tinkle, then, ever forewarned of her ap- 
proach, we should have time to reach our hole.. By this simple means we 
should live in safety, and defP her power.' The  speaker resumed his seat with 
a complacent air, and a murmur of applaue arm from the audience. An  old 
grey Mouse, with a merry twinkle in his eye, now got up, and said that the 
plan of the last speaker was an admirable me; but he feared it had one 
drawback. H e  had not told them who should put the bell around the Cat's 
neck. 
O n e  reason that, until fairly recently, analysts did not make preparation for 
implementation a subject of investigation during their study was the context in which 
they worked. Early operational researchers worked for the military and were themselves 
essentially embedded within the implementing organization, often vetting their ideas on 
the staff before they reached the commanders. Early systems analysts worked with mil- 
itary and industrial organizations, both of which have a strong line of authority that can 
usually insure that decisions made at the top will be carried out by the organization 
below, although not always efficiently and without modification. In fact, acceptance by 
decisionmakers of analytic methods and results became more the problem and operation- 
al researchers began to equate implementation with adoption and use of their work. If 
the O R / M S  output influenced a manager's decision in m e  way, it was then said to 
have been implemented (Schultz and Slevin 1975, p. 6). 
Later, when systems and policy analysts turned much of their attention to so- 
cial issues associated with housing, health, education, welfare, and other public affairs, 
inlplementatiuri was found to be a serious problem. Indeed, so ri~uch so, that for social 
application, systems analysis came to be regarded in m e  quarters as a worthless ap- 
proach (Ha 1972). 
Analysts then turned their attention to implementatinn, the sn-calld -missing 
link" in analysis. Archibald (1970), one of the earlier analysts to mention implementation 
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in the snse  used in this chapter, stressed that if did not follow automatically and of- 
fered suggestions for handling it: 
,even if the policy alternative recommended by the analyst is accepted by top 
dedsionmakers, the program that comes out of the organization may have lit- 
tle resemblance to the alternative originally envisaged by the analyst and the 
top decisionmakers I am not merely saying that an alternative when imple- 
mented may not produce the consequences expected. Rather I am saying that 
the policy alternafive actually executed is quite likely to have undergone radi- 
cal revisions at the liands of (the) operating levels. And since a policy is no 
better than its implementation, this suggests that analysts need to pay attention 
to the feasibility of a policy alternative at operating levels as well as m its ac- 
ceptability at the top decisionmaking level. 
Indeed, it may be argued that in many organizations decisions are really made 
from the bottom up. The policymakers may suggest, but it is the lower echelons who de- 
cide. 
Most early discussions of implementation, however, were retrospective and 
cmtained more descriptive than prescriptive material. (For instance, Pressman and Wil- 
davsky 1973; other material may be found in Bardach 1977 and 1980, Williams and 
McElmore 1976, Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein 1976, Bermen 1978, Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1974, and Hargrove 1975). The last two references contain major reviews of 
the literature. Wolf (1978) ties the reasons for the implementation shortfalls in public poli- 
cies to the predictable inadequacies of nonmarket organizations such as government itself. 
The major responsibility for the management of the implementation process 
lies with the decisionmaker but It is the analyst's proposal and design that is being imple- 
mented, he must then share responsibility for any failure of implementation. This means 
the analyst needs to give explicit attention to how particular policy alternatives are to be 
implemented. 
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2. DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION 
Consider a study to improve public tratisprtation for a city. Suppose the pri- 
mary alternatives considered are: 
(i) improvement of the current bus and expressway systems; 
(ii) introduction of a streetcar system (surface); 
(iii) introduction of a rapid transit elevated system; 
(iv) introduction of a subway system; 
Additional alternatives are formed by various combinations of the primary alternatives. 
Suppose a decision is made to introduce a subway. What are some of the dif- 
ficulties with implementatlon that may arise? 
For one thing, the current city transport authority, having handled only auto- 
mobile and bus traffic, may well have no experience with subway construction or with the 
operation of an underground electric railway. Consequently, the authority will have to be 
reorganized and augmented. Managers with seniority and political connections may have 
to be passed over. New staff with special experience and thus higher salaries will have to 
be added. T h e  known diff~culties with organizational decisionmaking will arise (March 
1965, March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1 x 3 ,  and Allison 1971). 
For another, the systems study on which the decision to introduce a subway 
was partially based, while it may have been detailed enough to enable the decisionmakers 
to dixiiminate among the surface, elevated, and subway alternatives t~ the current sys- 
tem, was very likely not detailed enough to arlswer many questions regarding implementa- 
tion. For instance. for comparison purposes. it was probably not necessary to investigate 
whether the subway station nearest city hall should be on the corner of First and Main or 
Second and Market streets. For implementation purpnses this has to be investigated and 
decided; after the decision the merchants at one location will profit and the losers will 
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protest. Bus routes and schedula will have to be rearranged to connect with those of 
the subway; people who lost service will flght to regain it. Parking lots will need to be oet 
up in the vicinity of stations in the suburbs at which commuters can leave their cars; some 
neighborhoods may object to these lots; some people wU be glad to sell the required land, 
some of the property may have to be acquired through legal proceedings. Thus the tran- 
sit authority, in addition to being concerned with management, financial control regula- 
tions, inspection and surveillance during construction, providing permits and clearances, 
and relations with other agencie~ will be beset with people (ie, political) problems No 
potential supplier of any of the necessary services is likely to cooperate unless it is to his (a 
his organization's) interest to do so. Sane  who interact with the program will not be clear 
where their interests lie; this can add to the confusion and delay. 
By examhation of a number of attempts to implement social policy decisions in 
the United States-policies striving to do such things as creating jobs for the hard-core 
unemployed, building new towns, getting teachers to act in a different mode, or protecting 
the civil liberties of persons alleged to be mentally ill-researchers have found such pro- 
grams to be characterized by underachievement of objectives, delay, and excessive finan- 
cial cost. Bardach (19'17) attributes many of the difficulties to the domination of the irn- 
plementatim process "by many actors all maneuvering with and against each other both 
for end results and for strategic advantages.' H e  terms these maneuvers 'games." 
One such maneuver is the attempt to divert resources, especially money, which 
ought to be used to enhance the program's objectives, to other purposes, often equally 
worthy. Another "game' or maneuver.is to deflect the goals of the effort, for instance, by 
what Bardach (1980, p. 238) calis Tiling On:' 
If a new program enjoys certain initial successes, it naturally expands its politi- 
cal support. It then becomes a target for interests who may have only minimal 
commitment to the program's objectives but who wish to capitalize on its 
growing political assets Such a program Is vulnerable to Piling On  in much 
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the same way that a cash-rich corporation is vulnerable to being taken over 
by another firm through a merger or a tender offer to shareholders. By  the 
time the Piling O n  process is over, the original program goal may have be- 
come greatly submerged aridlor the supporting coalition may have collapsed 
under the weight of the new interests. For example, the concept of 'affirma- 
tive action" in the United States once meant a commitment to give preferential 
treatment to job applicants from racial minorities when in other respects they 
were "equal" to applicants from non-minority backgrounds O v e r  the course of 
the last ten or fifteen years, however, the concept has come to mean quotas and 
a deemphasis on the "equality-in-other-respeas" criterion. Many traditional 
liberals who supported the more restricted "affirmative action' concept have 
become resentful and frightened at its maximalist redefinition and, in effect, 
have withdrawn energy and attention even from the initial goals. 
Other  maneuvers attempt to negate the effect of a new policy by installing 
non-sympathizers hlgh up in the enforcement agency, or by writing regulations and rules 
that condone existing practices and lighten the penalty for violations, or by setting a high 
threshold for violations and then putting the entire burden of proof on the implementing 
agency. Still another maneuver is to resist efforts to control behavior administratively by 
tokenism or procrastination. For others, see Bardach (1977). 
It is not only the lower, operating, levels that cause difficulties with implemen- 
tation. T h e  higher, policymaking, levels can cause problems. No rnanagtr, g m d  or bad, 
will forget that he has superiors or be unaware of their possible reactions to a decision that 
he may make. T h e  same applies to cann-littee chairmen and to the men-~ters  uf conrn.~it- 
tees who may be reporting to superiors whose objectives are by no means in agreement 
with those of the committee. O f  course, if a proposal has been well worked out and its 
implementation adheres completely to plan, the decisionmaker need ha.ve nn fms-but  in 
real life things seldom happen this way. There  is always something thar does not work 
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according to plan-conditions may not be precisely those predicted, other changes may 
occur to alter how the proposal is put into practice. Almost invariably some part of the 
objective will not be achieved, or achieved in a different way from the proposal. This is 
where the difficulty a r k s .  More often than not t h w  at higher levels in the hierarchy 
are more aware of departures from plan than they are of its overall successes. If these 
shortcomings are in areas in which they have particular interests, they are apt to react 
strmgly. Consequently, most managers are as sensitive to the consequences of a departure 
from plan as they are to its value as a whole. They adopt a fail-safe policy. They are ei- 
ther looking for something with no risk, or something that avoids certain areas of risk. 
This makes it essential for the systems analyst to have not only a good idea of the robust- 
ness of his solution but also of the entire "political" situation, including all the actors in- 
volved, and the pressure falling on the decisionmaker from higher levels of control. 
3. T H E  ANALYST AND IMPLEMENTATION 
There is a story that exists in different forms in many countries about a man 
from the big city who stayed for a few weeks in a small village. H e  did na like the life; 
he thought the villagers fools, and said so. Near the end of his stay he decided he ought 
to visit a friend who lived nearby and he asked a villager how to get there. "Oh, you 
want to go there," said the man, seeing his chance to get his own back. Well, no me but 
a fool would start from here." 
The story applies to systems analysts considering implementation. Here is the 
analyst, having completed his investigation, wondering how to ensure that his results are 
implm~mted. I f  you want to implement your ~esults," he might well be told, "rro me but 
a fool would start thinking about it now." Strange as it may seem. there are still foolish 
systems analysts about 
Why foolish? In the first place, because tn talk ab01~t implementation in this 
way indicates a fundamental ignorance of the processes by which change is achieved. In 
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the seumd, because such an action is contrary to the nature of systems analysis, and thus 
betrays an inconsistency that discredits the professional standards of the systems analyst. 
3.1. Organizational Decisiarm aking 
Implementation must be investigated early in the analysis T o  understand why 
this is so, it is necessary to examine how dedsions are taken in organizations. Descriptions 
of systems analysis, for instance, often make it appear that the problem under considera- 
tion, and the decisions that must be taken with regard to it, exist in isolation. This is not 
the case. One problem facing a decisionmaker is a small part of a time-space continuum 
of problems that he has to deal with, and his problems are part of a larger continuum of 
problems faced by his organization. The decisions taken with regard to his problem 
create new problems and af'fect others; similarly the decisions taken wlth regard to these 
other problems affect his Furthermore, managers rarely take decisions at a given time In 
a dispassionate manner, using only the Information provided at this time, without refer- 
ence to other information acquired in the past, even though this other information may be 
hearsay, and discredited by what is available at the time of decision. 
In any organization there is a gradual development of opinion as to how a de- 
cision should be structured. Even where this is not so, it is generally true that the final 
form of the information fed to the decisionmaker will have b e n  influenced by arbitrary 
decisions taken earlier, often by people outside the apparent power structure relating to 
this decision. T h e  shop stewards, the unions, even the rank and filc all have their influ- 
ence. Thus, even a one-time declsion to deal with a unique situation appears on analysis to 
be the end p i n t  of a systems process Moreover, it soon appears that the systems analyst 
is himself part of this process Indeed, from the start of the investigation-by the ques- 
tions he asks, the information he collects, and the dialogue m which he engages-he be- 
comes part of the decisionmaking system by virtue of his very existence. T o  be effective, 
he must design hls actions to be in tune with the behavior of the system, involving, or at 
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least informing, others of what he is doing. If he merely makes his input at the time of 
decisions, he mag affect the response of the system, but only in minor ways. The conse- 
quence is likely to be a perturbation in systems performance rather than the major im- 
provement sought 
A further point needs making here. We have said that the systems analyst is, 
whether he likes it or not, part of the decisionmaking process. The implied interactions 
work, however, in both directions. Not only does he affect the decisionmaking process 
from the dart of the investigation, but the system is also having its effect on his investiga- 
tion. It is as much a learning process for the systems analyst as for the system; in this way, 
and only in this way, he is able to tune his proposals finely to the requirements of the sys- 
tem. We shall discuss the practical implications later, but it is important to emphasize 
again the adaptive nature of good systems analysis 
3.2. The Role of the Analyst 
The  program for implementation depends, of course, on the type of problem 
under investigation. Preparation for the implementation of a decision by the managers of 
an industrial organization to install a computer program to expedite its operations can be 
vastly different from preparation for implementing a social program established by a leg- 
islature and having the force of law. Yet in the long run the successful implementation of 
either decision mag depend on the flexibility and robustness of the associated program for 
implementation in coping with varyirig circumstances that cannot be predicted in advance 
and its ability to withstand human error and deliberate misuse. 
T o  illustrate the role of the analyst in implementation, two cases involving the 
use of computers are presented. These iliustrations might apply either to the public or the 
private sector. 
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9.2.1. Improved Methods of Calculation 
Consider developing a set of computer programs to assist in designing tran- 
s p r t  systems irr coal mines conveying material from the coal face to the pit bottom. A 
typical colliery contains a number of productive faces from which the coal is transported 
to the shaft by means of conveyor belts. At  each junction in the underground roadway 
system the coal is tranderred from one conveyor to another and, since it is a mnverglng 
system, a trunk belt may receive coal from a number of faces. The flow of coal from 
each face is variable, the big output being oeveral times the average output and there are 
a number of occasions during the shift when there is no coal forthcoming from the face at 
all. It is essential that no part of the system be overloaded, for this causes a belt stoppage, 
which is transferred backwards to the face itself, with the consequence that production is 
lost. Moreover, if a loaded belt stops, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to restart it in 
the loaded condition. It is, therefore, essential to uncouple the various parts of the syskm, 
so bunkers are introduced. 
The extractive nature of coal mining means that faces at a colliery are always 
advancing. Moreover, their average life is about one to two years, so that, in effect, the 
entire conveying system has  to be redesigned at relatively frequent intervals. The prob- 
lem is to decide on belt capacities, hunker sizes, and the control rules for deciding when to 
load and unload the bunkers 
Fran a systems-andysis point of view, this is clear!y a simulation problem. 
However, because the problem is common to many collieries and, indeed, reoccurs from 
time to tirrle at the sane  colliery, it was desirable to develop a generd method of cdcula- 
tion to be used by planning engineers and work-study staff in any situation. It was, rnore- 
over, the fist planned exercise of this kind to be undertaken within the organization con- 
cerned, so that it was p ~ q n t i d  for the system to be Zen as effective and easy to use. A 
serious mistake in the early stages of its introduction could easily mean the failure of the 
April 29, 1980 
Chapter 9 
whole project. 
The fist stagr of the analysis was, therefore, to tackle the local design problem 
at two collieries. This meant developing computer programs for the local situation while 
observing the difficulties occurring in the process. The results of the work and how the 
method might be extended were also discussed in detail with the people concerned. 
These preparatory studies had two important consequences. In the first place, they made 
it possible to identify the major technical problems that would be involved in preparing a 
universal simulation program. Secondly, the succesdul use of the techniques reached the 
management teams, who were enthusiastic about the results and were able to talk to their 
professional colleagues about their potential use in a way that the systems analysts never 
could have. On the basis of the discussions held afhr this first study, the analysts 
resolved to go ahead and devise a more general program to be used at any colliery. 
This work, however, led to a new difficulty. When working at a single col- 
liery, the main contacts were the colliery planners, who provided the data on which the 
simulation was based, and who then used the completed computer program. When it 
came to developing a more general program, the managers responsible for the work were 
no longer those who would be using it personally. Nevertheless, it was essential that 
responsibility for developing the program and implementing it lie with the management. 
Accordingly, a joint committee was established consisting of t h r e  main el~mentc The 
chalrman of the committee was a management reprezntative and he had engineers on the 
canmittee whose joint task was to observe progress and advise on practical problems 
when they arose. The second element cmsisted of the systems team members, who ad- 
vised on the methods to be used and undertook tu develop the main part  of the program. 
Finally. the team included staff from the computer service. who were to ensure that the 
proposals made were compatible with the available computer system and that the whole 
was effectively systematized, so that the programs, once developed, would run quickly and 
econorn ically using relatively inexperienced staff. 
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This commlttee followed progress and arranged trials of the program. 
Once a program had been developed, it was necessary to test it for basic er- 
rors and then pass it to the management staff for training. The analysts developed a 
wries of courses, and, over a period of 12 months, some 100 planning and work-study en- 
gineers were trained in its use. These courses also included some of the operations 
research men who would have to advise on the program's use and ensure its effective ap- 
plication in nonstandard situations The important thing to remember with all simulation 
programs Is that the mechanics of using them are often easy to explain, but it is not at all 
easy to describe how to use them. In the wrong hands, simulation can prove to be an ex- 
pensive way of undertaking calculations that are unnecessary. 
Each person attending a course was able to run one dmulatlon before he went 
home. However, it was usually found that some assistance was required on home ground 
before these users were completely at home wlth the technique. Therefore, the presence of 
local operations research men who could advise them was invaluable. It was only after 
about a year that we found that the technique had been used at over 100 collieries, mostly 
without reference to the professional advisers. The programs, which have, of course, been 
cantinually improved and modified, have remained in steady use for many years. 
The Importance of this careful procedure is best illustrated by the fact that, 
when a major program improvement was developed three or four years later without 
such a carefbl process, all the f i s t  management users experienced maj?ior difficulties In us- 
ing it. The rumor quickly spread that the program was unreliable and management staff 
refusid to try it out. A lengthy trial under unusually rigid conditions was nec3sary be- 
fore confidence began to be restored. 
What, then, are the main lessons to be learned from this example? 
It is essential to have strong management support if a system like this is to 
be widely accepted. 
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There must be joint responsibility for development and testing. 
Particular care must be paid to train the staff to use the new method of cal- 
culation. 
There must be an adequate back-up service while management staff are 
grtting used to the technique, and, indeed, to educate new management sta. 
3.2.2. An Organizational System 
This second kind of computer system is different from the one considered in 
the previous section in that, once installed, it will be mandatory, that is, it will be part of 
the routine operation of the organization, and the people concerned with its operation will 
have no discretion as to whether they use it or not. This is equally true whether the new 
system replaces work previously undertaken in some other way or whether it provides 
some new service. It might be thought that the implementation problems of such a system 
are relatively easy, being confined to formal approval by the appropriate controller and 
the technical problems associated with the developing and debugging a computerized sys- 
tem. The reality is far more complex. For a system to operate successfully, the correct 
data must be fed into it, and the outputs must be both usable and used. All  these call for 
control. As systems become larger, it also becomes mare difficult for the people within 
them to have any understanding of the consequences of their actions, and the need for 
control increases. 
But even the best control system does not ensure the organizational system's ef- 
fectiveness and use, unless the system is properly matched both to the orgar~izatiun as a 
whole and to the individuals who must use it; indeed, these persons must both understand 
and accept it. Thus, for an organizational system, matching and control are the essence of 
succe,&ul irn plern e nt ation. 
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Consider the problem of implementing a centralized computer system for pro- 
visioning (ordering, stocking, and distributing) spare parts and equipment for a large, 
dispersed engineering orgmiization. 
While this is too large a subject to be covered here, two points of organization- 
al behavior need to be emphasized: 
There Is an innate resistance on the part of many people to undertaking 
work that appears to them to happen without some system, against the perceived interests 
of their immediate group (or even that of the organization as a whole). 
Once a working procedure has been established, it develops an internal sta- 
bility of its own. Attempts to make small changes often fail, because there is a natural 
tendency to revert to old and previous practices that feel understandable and comfortable. 
The  extent to which these factors can be controlled is discussed later, but the 
fact is that control can never overcome the problems that arise from bad design or poor 
installation. There is only one way to overcome the dangers and distortions arising in 
most manlcomputer systems to apply the principle of 'inversion,' which states that a pro- 
posed organizational design should be examined from the inside out, that is, the designer 
must explore the consequences of his design for the people in the system and analyze how 
they will rPact to the new pressures. Unless this is done, the new system will nnt be 
matched to the organization, and inefficiency and malfunction will result. 
T h e  next four subsections look at the characteristics of some of the most im-  
portant human elements in the system: 
(a) The  operators-thcse invoived with the detailed day-to-day operations of 
the stores 
(b) T h e  managers-tho= who deal with complaints and take responsibihty for 
the smooth running of the system. 
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(c) The maintainers-those who keep the system operational. 
(d) The controllers-those responsible for the system's overall performance. 
3.2.2.1. T h e  Operators 
Human operators are not mere ciphers to be considered equivalent to the elec- 
tronic units in the cmputer. By the standards of computer elements, they may be judged 
to a degree inferior in performance, but, they possess specific positive characteristics far 
outweighing so casual an assessment, yet tm often ignored both in systems design and im- 
plementation. More than one badly designed system has been saved from collapse be- 
cause its operators had a better understanding of its performance than the designer. Un- 
fortunately, the larger and more computerized the system becomes, the more difficult it is 
for opermrs to have this saving sense of what is happening. 
People have at least four important characteristics 
An extraordinary, even though fallible, memory. 
An abillty to relate cause to effect. 
Flexibility. 
A sense of purpose. 
Not all operators possess all these values-phaps only a minority-but a sys- 
tem that denies their existence will almost certainly run into serious trouble, particularly 
during implementation, for it is these skills that come into play then. Indeed, if the sys- 
tems designer is lucky, he will fmd that the operators to some degree redesign the system 
for him. He may futd that he can never get a complicated systeni up to full o p e r a w  6- 
ficiency without their help. 
These human characteristics are also important in routine operation in coping 
with the predictable mishaps that cannot be dealt with at the computer kvel. Thus, if the 
wrong part number is given in a requisition, the storekeeper very often remembers the 
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rlght one. If the item has been misplaced in the store, he may guess where to look for it; 
if it s t f U  cannot be found, he may be able to identify another item that is like the one re- 
quired. Emcient design demands that these human characteristics be used. 
Implementing a system that denies the operator the opportunity to be human is 
likely to run into difficulties, for it reduces him not just to a cipher, but to a hostile and 
uncooperative element of the system. 
Another important value of the human operator is his tendency to take short 
cuts If it appears to him that effort, time, or money can be saved, he is likely to try to 
save it-and, furthermore, without consultation, unless there is some countervailing reason. 
Thus, if items are in short supply in his shop, he may d o  some private rationing to ensure 
that supplies last until the next delivery. 
More importantly still, he can report on any sudden changes of conditions, and 
thus bring corrective procedures into action faster than the computer control system can. 
On the other hand, if he has to perform a detailed calculation, but thinks he knows the 
answer from experience, he will give his answer. If he has to record information in diffi- 
cult or dirty conditions, he is very likely to try to remember the information and record it 
later. Information believed to be irrelevant is given less attention than facts whose value 
is  apparent. 
These difficulties can be overcome and the advantagps pxploitpd if the system 
is properly matched to the operator's actual characteristics. (Incidentally, to dlow for the 
fact that an operation can best be done in different ways by different people in differerit 
places, there is no reason for some flexibility not to be allowed sometimes in systems 
design.) Failure to appreciate this has led to serious systems Pdiures when trat~sferring a 
general computer system from one context to another, from one country to another or one 
administrative unit to another; the principle also sometimes holds, when one person re- 
places anahpr This  matching is something that needs to be examined in detail when the 
implementation stage is being considered, but it alm needs to be reviewed continually 
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throug%wt the life of a system. It is as much a problem of implementation as design. 
I! muse not, of course, be assumed that the operators are unalterable in their 
abilities or their understandings they too are capable of adapting, but they need training 
and teaching (the former for acquiring specific skills, the latter for developing under- 
standing). How to proceed requires careful analysis If there is a mismatch, it must be 
identified, and then analyzed. Often the best people to undertake this analysis are the 
operators themselves. They do not need to know the details of the whole system, which 
they could hardly be expected to understand, but they do need to know the consequences 
of their possible actions on the system as well as to be able to comment on the conse- 
quences for themselves 
Finally, there remains the question of control. Whether from direct disobedi- 
ence, unconscious drift, or changing conditions, operator performance will in time become 
unratisfacrory, and a cohtrol system must exist to ensure that it continues to meet the ob- 
jectives of the system. How can such control be instituted? What indices can be used to 
ensure that departures from the desired performance are detected? While the answers to 
such questions must be specific to a given system, they are seldom obvious Thus, a provi- 
sioning servke has to minimize costs subject to a given level of service. The casts can be 
measured in part, but the level of service i s  much more difficult to identify. Similarly, 
one can check that all necessary forms have been filled in, but not that they have been 
Wed in correctly. Checks on stock levels are expensive to carry out. and are undertaken 
infrequently, and mistakes that may have occurred can rarely be traced to their origins. 
The problem of control may be one of management as much as systems design, but it is 
essential that such indices as the system producs be well understood and related to the 
real control problem. not simply to the computer's functioning. 
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3.2.22. T h e  Managers 
In this context a manager is one who is responsible to a group of ciistomers for 
a mrvice or function, for which the computer systmni is intended to provide the routim 
operating element. Thus, his work has a highly discretionary element. For example, one 
of the issues on which he must rule is whether or not to make a special order for items in 
short supply. An analytically designed provisioning system, of course, has reordering rou- 
tines applicable when there is an established pattern of use. However, what happens with 
spare-parts ordering when a machine has only been in use for a short time, or when the 
operating divisions place a large new order for some well-established piece of equipment? 
In order to be able to cope with such situations, the manager must have an awareness of 
such special actions as may be necessary when the standard routines no longer apply. It is, 
of course, conceivable in theory for the system to be able to cope with all occurrences, but 
in practice it may not be worthwhile programming rare possibilities into the system. In 
any case, trouble shooting when serious deviations occur provides managers with their 
most difficult and interesting tasks When an emergency occurs, the manager must be 
able to take action with some knowledge of what its consequences may be. Suppose, for 
instance, that a supplier has production problems that greatly increase the lead times on 
orders. What  will the effect of this be m the company's stocks? What will the cmse- 
quence of remedial actions be? It is unlikely for the m a n q e r  to know how to handle 
every eventuality himself, so he must be able to get this knowledge promptly. Thus, he 
must have quick and easy access to people who know and who can undertake the ap- 
propriate aialyws. These people are cdled the 'rnaintainers." It  is alsu important to real- 
ize that all systems have to cope occasionally with unexpected events, and that robustness 
and flexibility may be more important than an optimal solution. A system that can c o p  
with a variety of inputs is better than one that is highly efficient fnr a singlp kind of input. 
Again, these may be thought to be questions of design, but they are criticd when it comes 
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to implementation. The manager knows only too well the problems he has to cope with. 
If he f e l s  that the system does n u  help, implementatton will be slow. He  may not be able 
to explain why, but his reluctance may be justified. 
Although managers have powers of discretion, they are, of course, part of the 
overall system, and thus subject to checks and controls. Because of those powers of dis- 
cretion, however, these controls need to be primarily through indices of performance rath- 
er than checks on procedure. It is essential for these indices to be hpue measures of per- 
formance; Indices taken in isolation can often work to the overall detriment of service. 
3.22.3. T h e  Main tainers/Installers 
What, it may be asked, has systems maintenance got to do with implementa- 
tion? The  answer is a good d e 4  simply because many of the problems that occur later in 
modifling the system are the same as those that occur in implementation. T h e  basic ques- 
tions are therefore those of systems design, and all that needs to be said here is that five 
elements arr needed. 
1. Close contact with the systems analysts, managers and operators involved in 
the plan. 
2 A set of diagnostic procedures. 
3. A set of predictive simulations that can forecast the effects ofchangp. 
4. A well documented basic prqrarn structured to allow for change. 
5. Above all, an implementation plan that is known to all m d  that can be 
modified by those responsible for operating the system. 
The imprtar~ce d the first and last of these cannot be overstreed.  A 
manfcomputer system is a living thing which does not behave in detail as it is designed. 
but neither does it behave in detail in the way that those within it say it doer The main- 
tainer needs to be able to analyze and interpret what is happening; thus, there needs lo be 
a systems analyst, not just a computer programmer. 
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3.2.2.4. T h e  Controller 
The controller is centrally hvdved  in implementing a new system. He is corrr- 
mined to Installing the system-probably more strongly than anyone else, because it does a 
job he sees the need for doing; however, he also has to accept responsibility for its cost, 
and, should it come to a bad end, for its failure. He also has the task of resolving a host 
of minor conflicts between his staff and the systems designers He  has to decide on where 
flexibility may be allowed and where new procedures are enforced in detail He  must 
discuss departures from the plan, and the effect they will have, not only on his staff, but 
also on his customers Above all, he must satisfy himself that he is getting what he wants; 
and, beyond that, whether the specification he agreed to actually meets his needs. This 
last point is an important one: who can blame the system's designer for doing what was 
agreed upon, even If the agreement should not have been reached in the first place? In 
truth, there is no excuse-it is the designer's responsibility to see that what the customer 
says he wants is really what he needs. It is remarkable how often this point is overlooked 
when new organizational systems are established. In the provisioning case, for example, it 
is usually assumed that the prime purpose is to ensure that the stock ordering, storage, and 
movement activities minimize overall costs. If this is the sole p u r v ,  the whnle thing be- 
comes a mechanical operation, the controller can go home, and the computer can take 
over. H e  knows, however, that he cannot go home. If his organization faces a severe cash 
shortage, he must reduce stocks even if it means that overall costs p up. If he is in con- 
flict with suppliers, 01 n-rust bala-ice iertainty of supply agdnst average lead time, or if he 
is negotiating discounts. he must have a system he can control. He  must know the conse- 
quences of his actions, and he must be in control. 
The design 13 a system that enables the contmll~r tn cut nverall stocks in thp 
best way is different from one that assumes overall costs always to be minimized; it is no 
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more difficult, just different It becomes difficult only when me  tries to use the system 
for something it was not designed for. Thus, care is needed at the pre-implementation 
phase. 
The controller's next problem is control. How does he assure hirr~self that the 
system k working properly and efficiently? The  designer must bear in mind that several 
features of the new system will be new and that the controller will not have an instinctive 
understanding of what values new indices should take. (Do not underrate the importance 
of instinct to a senior manager; it is often the reason he has risen in the hierarchy.) Most 
of his indicators are internal-costs, quantities, staff, etc.-and he has estimates from the 
systems designer he can use for comparisons. However, it is necessary to make two warn- 
ings. In the first place, almost by definition no system with an external purpose can be 
judged adequately from internal evidence; external indicators must also be introduced, 
and to be effective there must be data su that cornparims can be made before and after 
implementation. Second, it is also necessary to ensure that no problems are being pushed 
to one side in the course of implementation. Neglected problems can cause backlogs that 
lead later to serious deterioration in performance. Indicators that some problem has been 
overlooked may be nervous distress in the staff, or steady or increasing overtime. At the 
implementation phase, no disturbance is tm small for study. 
4. O T H E R  PROBLEMS 
For certain issues, the alternatives competing for choice by the decisionmakers 
may differ in the ease with which they can be implemented. The probability of unsuc- 
cessful irnplenlentation should be taken into account in tho an1puison. If dtcrnsltive A is 
chosen and it is discovered later that implementation cannot be carried out successfully. 
resources will have been expended and possibly other costs generated. Alternative B may 
then have to be implemented instead. Thus, in a cat-benefit analysis, to determine the 
excess of benefits over cast for the various alternatives, the probability of failure during 
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implementation may have to be estimated for each alternative and the expected casts 
thereby incurred taken in account (Peterson and Seo 1972). 
Similarly, before implementation has started, the analyst must make sure that 
the necessary resources, financid and otherwise, are available. 
The  wastepaper baskets of the world are fllll of sound proposals never carried 
out because the resources were not available to act on them. It may not be the whole 
resource that is lacking, but only one small, even trivial, element of the whole. Neverthe- 
less, once the opportunity has been lost, it seldom comes W n .  Accordingly, it is essential 
for any recommendation arising out of a project directed toward a single decision to be 
matched to the available resources. 
The  first resource that has to be considered is, of course, money. In most or- 
ganizations, the financial resources are limited either by the amount of cash that can be 
raised or by rules laid down by a higher level of management. Thus, the project must be 
not only attractive in itself but also relatively attractive in connection with other proposals 
that management may be considering. Clearly, it is essential for the analyst to be aware 
of the system in which financial decisions are made, what the criteria are, and, if possible, 
what rival projects may be competing. 
Physical resources must also be considered. A proposal that requires equip- 
ment that cannot be btained Or land that may not be available, or gives rise to environ- 
mental consequences that may be unacceptable, will inevitably be rejected, even though it 
may be highly desirable without these physical limitations It c x  never be argued by a 
systems analyst that Such factors are not my concern." 
It ca-I be argued t h d  the iniportance of finarlciai atid physical rewurces is 
self-vident. that any competent systems analyst will automatically take full account of 
them in the course of his work. Moreover, it is easy to see how this can be done, and easy 
to check that it has been clone. However, the problem of the human rcr.murces is altogeth- 
e r  more difficult. Clearly, the human consequences of the proposals should be included in 
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the systems analysis Just as the financial and physical ones, but the problems of doing 
this are more subtle. The proposal may call for more or fewer people working in an in- 
stallation; it may require them to do different work. Some will gain in influence and 
power, others lose. Too, the good manager is concerned not only with the d i ~ c t  conse- 
quences but the secondary consequences. What effect will such a change have on the atti- 
tudes and efficiencies of those working with him? Is the proposal so agamst their opinions 
and prejudices that they will adopt it with reluctance? Will this reluctance reduce their 
efficiency or the quality of the advice he will receive on other matters? The  good 
manager is not simply looking at this m e  decision. He must have peripheral vision that 
enables him to sense all the other consequences. If the advantages to be derived f ran  a 
proposal that his staff will find difficult to accept are very great, he may still decide to go 
ahead. If, however, they are relatively small, he may well decide that the incidental cost 
to him of the proposal outweighs its apparent advantages. Thus, in translating proposals 
into reality, it is essential to make a careful study of the manager's human resources. 
5. COPING W I T H  1MPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO DECISION 
5.1. Matters of Good Practice 
How can the implementation process be structured so as to maximize the p s -  
sibility that what is decided will be carried out and the objectives attained? Sabatier and 
Magrnanian (1979) contend that the following five conditions are sufficient to insure suc- 
cessful implementation: 
1. The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in tar- 
get group behavior to the achievement of the desired end-state (objective). 
2. The statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous 
pdcy  and structures the implementation process 90 as to maximize the likeli- 
hood that target groups will perform as desired. 
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S. T h e  leaders of the implementing agencies possess substantial 
managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory goals. 
4. T h e  program is actively supported by orgar~ized constituency 
groups and by a few key legislators ( or by the chief executive) throughout the 
implementation process, with the courts being neutral or supportive. 
5 T h e  relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly 
undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by 
changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that undermine the statute's 
'technical' theory or political support. 
This last condition, of course, can not be known in advance. While the analyst 
can not insure that conditions such as the above exist, he can help a great deal in bringing 
about 1 and 2. T h e  does this by formulating sound theory and clear objectives, by sug- 
gesting the implementation program, and by anticipating the problems in implementation 
and finding ways to overcome them. 
First, if the alternatives proposed to the decisionmakers are not directed to- 
ward clear objectives or are not based on sound principles, the decision may be a poor one 
and not suited to the issue to be resolved. The program that is implemented is then not 
likely to bc succ~ssful. to again quote Bardach (198n) 
... the basic social, economic, and political theory behind the policy must be rea- 
sonable and sophisticated: it will not do, for instance, to pretend that most peo- 
ple do not act most of the time in accord with a rather restricted notion of 
their self-irrtercst; nor will it do to ignore inconverrient features of the world 
like the sparse supply of managerial and technical competence or the enormous 
variety of local circumstances which policies must serve or the immense diffi- 
culty of coordinating large-scale activities on the basis of plans and promises 
rather than market signals. 
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Second, a basic administrative strategy for implementation should be disigned. 
Such a strategy should be simple, placing as little rellance on bureaucratic processes as 
p l b l e  (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Levine 1972, Knee= and Schultz 1975). It 
should include an estimate of the financial resources required by the implementing organi- 
zation to hire staff, administer the program, monitor the changes, and to carry out any 
further analysis necessary. For, each policy alternative-who has to do what? when? 
how?-must be investigated. If the implementing organization exists, the analysts need to 
pay attention to effects of the program to be implemented internal to the organization. 
Such effects may seem trivial but can have serious consequences A decision to change 
the pattern of garbage collection in New York City was seriously delayed because it dis- 
rupted car pools (Beltrami 1977). Sometimes incentives can be designed that will increase 
cmperation. 
In any event the analyst should work with his client's staff, involving them in 
the research if possible. This means not merely providing data and assumptions but ques- 
tioning forecasts and hypotheses, proposing alternatives, and pointing out where the dim- 
culties in implementation might lie. 
Third, obviously the analyst must attempt to anticipate the problems to be 
faced during implementation. T o  do this, one might consider the list of program elements 
and their source and support-such things as regulations and guidelines, financial accoun- 
tability mechanisms, goods and services needed, the participation by various agencies and 
bureaus, sources of funds, m d  so cjn. Next, one can ask: 'Whai can g~ wrcxlg?' 'What 
can be done about it?' A systematic way to approach these questions is through scenario 
development. 
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5.2. hplementation Scenarios 
T h e  development of scenarios is one of the most useful devices for anticipating 
the future where uncertainty is l&ge (Chapter 4, Brown 1968, Helmer 1966). Prepara- 
tion af a set of hypothetical ru ture  historiesm of a proposed program forces the program 
designer to think seriously about the stresses and strains to which his proposed program 
may be subjected if implemented. Bardach (1977 pp. 254-255) observes 
It  is no easy task for the designer to predict, and following prediction to read- 
just, the outcanes of such dynamic and complex processes as are involved in a 
loose system of implementation games. In fact, the system is so complicated 
that it thoroughly defies analysis by means of even the most complex models 
known to any of the social or behavioral sciences. It must be approached 
through what has come to be known as "scenario writing." This  latter method 
simply involves an imagmative construction of future sequences of actions- 
consequent conditions-actions-consequent conditions It is inventing a plausi- 
ble story about -what will happen if.,' or, more precisely, inventing several 
such stories Telling these stories to oneself and one's professional peers helps 
to illuminate some of the implementation paths that the designer does not want 
taken. He  or she is then in a position to redesign =me f ea tu r~s  of the system 
of implementation games that permit him or her and his or her colleagues to 
tell stories with happier endings Trial and error through successive iteratizr,; 
produce better and better endings. 
Obviously, scenario writing is an art. It requires iti~agirration and 
intuition. One  suspects there is not much that can be formahzed or codified 
about how to do  it well. This  may be one of the reasons why scenario writing 
is, in fact, not very common even among the most experienced policy analysts 
and designers 
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Bardach (1977, pp. 264-265) offers an outline for writing an implementation 
ranaria It suggests such steps as making an inventory of the program elements, paying 
attention to who controls them either directly or indirectly, and statements as to how 
management will deal with problems d social entropy, incmpetence for instance. Also it 
asks the scenario writer to show how the policy will deal with various dilemmas of 
rdministration-tokenism, procrastination, massive ~esistance, diversion of resource& and 
others. 
For certain problems special analyses directed toward questicms d implementa- 
tion may be desirable, for others an experimental approach may be called for. 
5.3. Implementation Analysis 
Many studies can and should be done in two stages: a fust analysis to find out 
what type of action should be taken or what sort of alternative to recommend, and then a 
acond analysis to speciffi the details of the designated alternative and to suggest how to 
implement it. Such analyses, leading to the translation of a policy decision into a spec if^ 
program whose objective is to carry out the policy's intent, are termed implementation 
analysess A s  an example, consider the hypothetical public transportation study mentioned 
earlier. T o  evaluate the advantages of a streetcar system over a subway, the decision- 
makers probably need not consider whether the tracks should be laid on 1st or on 2nd St. 
or whether the cars should have forty or fiftY seats. But if a streetcar system is to be in- 
stalled, those decisions will have to be made. Again, in the Oosterxhelde flood-control 
study outlined in Chapter 1, after the decision was made to chow the flow-through dam 
with a gate that cwld be cbsed durlng a mrm,  fllrther analysis had to be done to deter- 
mine the most practical width for the gate. 
su he term implementation analysis Is also used to rder to the study of why authoritative 
decisions do mt  lead to expected results (Bermen 1978) or to how 'specific nonmarket 
activities (e.g. public policies) can be expected to operate, and to depart in predictable 
ways frun their costs and consequences as originally estimated" (Wolf 1978). 
Chapter 9 
Sometimes, the analysis that takes into accwnt the deatils of implementation 
can be postponed until aftt. the primary decision; in other cases, it may have to be done 
earlier, at least irr part, in order to set the ranking of the top two or three alternatives. 
5.4. Social Eirper lents 
Decisions (whether they are the results of analysis or not) taken to alleviate so- 
cial problems are notorious for unsatisfactory consequences. Implementations have fre- 
quently failed to achieve their objectives, often resulting in exorbitant costs and inducing 
great social disruption. One possible way to find out in advance that a program may not 
work as intended and thus avoid wasting resources and political prestige may be to con- 
duct a social experiment before starting a full-scale program. 
In practice, a social experiment is an organized attempt to pretest a particular 
innovative policy before committing vast resources to the solution of some large 
social problem. An example might be the experiment in New Jersey with in- 
come maintenance, undertaken before there was a national commitment to such 
a program. In this case, alternative programs were tested on sample popula- 
tions in several other states (Brewer 1973). 
The housing experiment described in Chapter 1 is a n ~ t h ~ r  such example. Far 
hr ther  discussion of the use of social experiments see the chapter on experimentation in 
Volume 2 of this Handbook and Riecken (1974). 
A major advantage of experhentation is that it reveals empirical information 
about the prop& luge  program. Clues to the possible activities of those who lase or 
gain from the program are obtained and minor changes that ease the path to implementa- 
tion without compromising the objectives may be discovered. 
Social experiment ation is not a panacea that guarantees successf~~l implementa- 
tion. There are frequently ethical, methodological, or political reasons why experimenta- 
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tian is unwise. Brewer (1973 p. 1%) mentions some of  these ethical k u e s  
How are different bmdlts received by experimental subjects reconciled and 
judlfled? At  the conclusion of an experiment, how does cine make restitution 
for an e x p l m m t a l  alternative not finally chosen but upor1 which recipients 
have become dependent? What about confidentiality of data and other human 
problems associated with the canduct of the experiment? These and many 
other primarily ethical issues all come into play and must be accounted for by 
the social experimenter. 
Methodological problems are often formidable. It is not easy to design a valid 
experiment. An experiment is not a mere demonstration or a small-scale trial implemen- 
tation of a large program that is under consideration. Such exercises are often useful but 
a proper experiment requires a properly selected control group and careful analysis of the 
results An excellent discussion of the sort af implementation problems that would be 
likely to ark with a hll-scale program, that were n u  detected in a small-scale demons- 
tration, is provided by Davis and Salasin (1978). 
6. COPING W I T H  IMPLEMENTATION AFTER DECISION 
Tt should be clear that analysis before, or just after, a decision cannot insure 
that the implementation will go smoothly. Circumstances change and the unexp~ted  can 
happen, requiring modification in the program for implementation. Analysis is needed 
both to find satisfactory modifications and to monitor and evaluate what take: place. Usu- 
ally, because the authorities responsible for overseeing the implementation program are not 
those who made the original decision, analysts other than those who did the original study 
an involved. 
Other than through the use of analysis, the deasionmaker or the agent of the 
deciding authoritg has essentially twc? approaches to keep implement atbn on the desired 
path: mediaticm and persuasion, and intervention using the power of the mandate. 
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6.1. Mediation and Persuasicn 
6.1.1. Organizational Development 
Here, a "ct.age agent" enters into a collaborative relationship with the organi- 
zatic - ind atterrps to produce the planned change. H e  attempts to change structure and 
processes within the orgmization; decisions are not viewed as being imposed from on high 
but rather decisionmaking is envisaged as a participatory process (Archibald 1970). The 
organizational developsr may be a systems analyst, but different training is required. Tlie 
approach does run the risk, however. of legitimatizing large distortions of the policy goals 
(Bardach 1980, p. 289). The successful strategy, however, often depends critically on the 
special characteristics of the target organization. A s  an exampl~, .we Archibdd (19'19) on 
the problems of managing change in f r e  departments, organizations that are characteristi- 
cally low in complexity, but high in centralization and in formalization. 
6.1.2. Negotiations 
The negot:aor's goal is to reduce the delays, the misunderstandings, and the 
confusion associated with implementation by communication, persuasion, and face-to-face 
bargaining. The analyst can help by suggesting the ways to compromise that do the most 
to retain the policy goals. T h e  negotiating process can create problems as well as solve 
them (Bardach 1977, pp. 221-244). 
6.2. Using the Power of the Mandate 
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6.2.1. Project Management 
Project management has worked well for the U.S. Department of Defense 
(Polaris) and for NASA to carry out most space missions. Project managers an widely 
used in private industry for keeping a project on schedule and c a t s  within preset limits. 
One individual controls the implementation. Traditionally, he uses systems analysis, com- 
puters, PERT, and other .moderng management aids. It represents a way of overcoming 
the limitations of the usual functional separation of labor (into sales, production, and 
research, for instance) when the organization undertakes a l a r ~  complex project by con- 
centrating power and responsibility in one indiv1dua.L How well project management 
works for social programs is still a question. 
6.2.2 Political Control 
A project manager is limited by lack of authority; he is an writ, not the origi- 
nator of the policy mandate or its political trustee. H e  cannot stand against strong political 
opposition. In contrast, an influential legislator or top political appointee can keep a pro- 
gram on track by interesting himself in its progress, playing the role of a ITixer' (Bardach 
1977)-mediating, arbitrating, coaxing, bullying, using hls political clout. Such a fixer 
cannot work alone; he needs a staff, including analysts, to handle the detail work. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The  selection of an implementation strategy and modiQing it when necessary 
to hold tir its objectives is sonletirries not considered arr arralytic furictiou. But all the 
characteristic activities that analysis can assist are there; choices have to be made in the 
face of uncertainty, data has to be turned into information, analyzed, and communicated, 
tasks have to be delegated, and incentives established. Hence systems analysts have a 
role in preparing for implementation, in carrying it out, and in evaluating and monitoring 
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the results to determine whether the policy is performing as it should. 
If, during the course of an analysis, it becomes clear that a program or course 
of action cannot be successhlly implemented, then it can never be recommended to the 
decisbnnr alrer for his choice. That does not mean it should not be ir~vestigated or even 
that it should not be cdled to their attention. In government, it is often clear &om the 
start that the policy that will bring the most significant improvement in a given situation 
is not politically feasible and cannot be implemented. Such policies should often be stu- 
died nevertheless, for otherwise there may be no way for the public to learn the coat of a 
current political constraint. 
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